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Do Market Pressures Induce Economic Efficiency:  The Case of Slovenian Manufacturing, 
1994-2001  
 
 A long-held but infrequently tested proposition in economics is that competitive pressure 
will force firms to be efficient. 1   The transition to market in formerly planned economies offers 
a natural laboratory to test the competitive hypothesis.  As reviewed by Boeri (2000), the 
consensus expectation at the outset of transition was that competitive pressures from the 
emerging market system would force greater productive efficiency on enterprises that remained 
from the old system.  Furthermore, converting state-owned enterprises into profit maximizing 
firms was expected to create incentives to improve the efficiency of these often-underperforming 
sectors, either through profit motives or through the rigors of investor scrutiny (Brada, 1996). 
This study examines whether market competition had the expected effect on productive 
efficiency in Slovenia. 
 The early evidence from transition economies did not demonstrate immediate evidence of 
efficiency gains.  From an initial reduction in GDP averaging 25% in Central and Eastern Europe 
and 50% in the former Soviet states, production recovered unexpectedly slowly.  Only 2 of 25 
transition countries had matched their 1989 production levels ten years later (Campos and 
Coricelli, 2002).  Some of the slow recovery may be that competitive pressures grew slowly.  For 
example, most countries only gradually abandoned tax and transfer policies that effectively taxed 
the expanding sectors to subsidize those in decline; and it took time to establish legal institutions 
that supported property rights and limited corruption (Boeri, 2000; Svejnar, 2002).  However, 
some have argued that that increased competition itself may have contributed to reduced 
production because it disrupted the formerly well-organized trading systems linking Warsaw 
Pact countries (Blanchard and Kremer, 1997). 
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 As the transition to market has progressed, a consensus is emerging that efficiency gains 
are forthcoming from competitive market pressures, although the magnitude of the effect is 
uncertain.  The review by Djankov and Murrell (2002), summarizing 23 studies of the impact of 
increased competition on firm performance, suggested that competition raised efficiency in 
central and eastern Europe but not in the former Soviet Union.  Similarly, their examination of 
37 studies on the impacts of privatization found that it raised efficiency in Central and Eastern 
Europe but not in countries of the former Soviet Union.  Even within regions, however, there is 
substantial variation in the magnitude, and even the sign of the productivity effects, so the 
average masks considerable variation across studies.2    
Past studies of the impact of transition on firm efficiency have concentrated on 
potentially unrepresentative subsets of the firms in transition economies.  As we demonstrate in 
this study, these subsamples can yield misleading inferences regarding efficiency gains in these 
economies.  One common strategy is to concentrate on large, formerly state-owned enterprise 
that survived into the transition.  The focus is natural, as these are the types of firms that existed 
under socialism, but this approach misses the contributions to efficiency from the entry of new, 
more efficient firms and from the closing or exit of the least efficient firms. McMillan and 
Woodruff (2002) argue that the, “success or failure of a transition economy can be traced in large 
part to the performance of its entrepreneurs.”  They concluded that the most successful transition 
economies were those that fostered the entry and success of new firms and not necessarily those 
that most aggressively privatized former state enterprises.  In addition, most studies use a single 
cross section of data or else a short time frame, but most countries adopted competitive policies 
only gradually over several years.  If efficiency gains were only realized over time, short panels 
may understate the impact of market competition on efficiency.  
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This study contributes to the existing knowledge regarding the impact of market forces 
on production efficiency by utilizing a unique data set encompassing every manufacturing firm 
in Slovenia over a long time span.  Our data include not only continuously existing firms, but 
also newly formed firms and firms that cease production during the period of study. In contrast 
to many existing studies, we can therefore identify the impacts of firm entry and exit on 
productive efficiency in the transition to market. Second, we examine the progress of efficiency 
over a long period of time -- from 1994 through 2001.  The eight year period is sufficiently long 
to determine whether measured efficiency gains or losses are permanent or a consequence of 
short-term economic shocks. And third, the paper deals with Slovenia, a country often 
considered a special case among transition countries, and thus it can provide interesting case 
findings from the comparative perspective.  
Our results strongly confirm the importance of competitive pressures in raising firm total 
factor productivity.  The efficiency gains were progressive, rising each year.  They are broad 
based, occurring in almost all industries examined.  While the largest gains were in private firms, 
competitive pressures at the industry level appeared to increase total factor productivity in firms 
under state or mixed ownership as well, suggesting that is not ownership type but competition 
that spurs the greatest gains in efficiency.  However, firm ownership type did matter in the 
aggregate.  Competitive pressures at the industry level due to higher market share of private 
firms, foreign-owned firms, and imported goods in the industry raised the productivity of all 
firms in the industry, whether privately owned, state owned, or foreign owned.  Competitive 
pressures also contribute to efficiency gains by sorting out the least efficient firms, while 
entering firms are at least as efficient as surviving firms. This sorting effect is at least as large as 
the effect of competition on continuing firms in our preferred specification.  These conclusions 
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are not sensitive to alternate specifications or controls for firm-specific factors.  As a result, the 
role of market forces in generating economic efficiency is strongly confirmed. 
I. Policies that Affect the Market Competition in Slovenia 
As part of former Yugoslavia, Slovenia’s economy was characterized by government 
rather than private ownership of assets.  Although nominally under a worker managed system, 
there was extensive political interference in firm decisions regarding investment, employment 
and wages.  To meet mandated payrolls, a massive system of discretionary taxes and transfers taxed 
away net revenue from profitable enterprises in order to subsidize failing firms that could not meet 
their payrolls.   Inefficient firms could lose money indefinitely, while efficient firms could not build 
up reserves that could allow expansion.3   Restrictions on capital mobility also restricted efficient 
resource allocations.  Socially-owned firms were not allowed to sell their assets, nor could 
workers obtain a return on capital if they invested in the firm by accepting wage concessions.  
Consequently, there was little incentive to invest in capital.  Private firms were limited to no 
more than 10 workers, and so also faced limits to growth.  
Slovenia’s transition began toward the end of 1988.  After a lengthy initial contraction 
that lasted through 1992, unemployment reached 15.4% (Boeri and Terrell, 2002).  Since then, it 
has declined slowly to 5.9% in  2002.  Per capita GDP fell initially, but rebounded by 1995 and 
reached $11,000 in 2002.  Accompanying the recovery was a gradual liberalization of the rules 
and institutions governing the economy.  Reforms replaced worker management and government 
interventions with market institutions and individual incentives that we would expect to increase 
competitive forces in the economy.  We briefly summarize the nature and timing of these 
reforms.  
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Policies affecting market competition 
Slovenia’s structural reforms addressed all vital segments of the economy, from price 
liberalization, the introduction of new organizational forms of enterprises, promotion of 
competition, privatization and restructuring of enterprises, reforms of the financial sector, 
liberalization of foreign trade and foreign ownership, legal ratification of property rights, and 
dismantling the system of guaranteed employment and centralized pay setting.   The European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) monitors progress on these various reforms. 
As shown in Figure 1, Slovenia’s structural reforms have progressed steadily but unevenly across 
sectors.  Liberalization of foreign trade and of prices was already well underway by 1991, as was 
privatization of small firms.  Other reforms began later and with slower progress.  The legal 
process for privatization of large state enterprises began in 1993, and started in earnest in 1994.  
About the same time, reforms of the banking system and of other financial institutions began. 
Compared to other transition economies, Slovenia’s pace of structural reforms was slower than 
average.  Nevertheless, by the end of the period, Slovenia’s overall EBRD transition index 
reached the average of other countries. 4 
Ultimately, we will conclude that it is the combination of these liberalization policies that 
are important for increasing market pressures rather than any single policy in isolation.  
Nevertheless, it is useful to provide additional details on the most important avenues by which 
competition was encouraged.  It will be particularly important that policies allow firm entry and 
exit.  As concluded by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Bartlesman and Doms (2000), a large share 
of productivity growth in industrialized economies has been attributed to resource reallocation 
through new firm start-ups and closings 
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Setting up new businesses. The new Law on Enterprises (first passed in 1988) was ineffective 
until amended in 1993.  It allowed the owners of the capital (shareholders) to control firm 
decisions and it freed private firms from constraints on the number of workers.  It also 
introduced new forms of enterprises, including general and limited sole-proprietorships; limited 
liability partnerships (the most common form); and joint-stock companies.  Previously existing 
organizational forms including state enterprises, cooperatives, and mixed enterprises 
(combinations of private, state, and cooperative ownership) were also retained. 
While the above law allowed for entry of new private firms, formidable administrative 
barriers to entrepreneurship have remained. These barriers slowed the reaction to the new 
opportunities.5  Private firms are required to register, a process that takes 1-3 months despite 
recent policies to shorten the process.  In contrast, registration in western economies takes only 
few days.6  Next, new enterprises must obtain location, construction, and business permits from 
the local government, a process that requires documentation of business plans, location, and staff 
qualifications.  If land must be acquired for the business, there are additional problems caused by 
unresolved ownership disputes carrying over from the Socialist era and to cumbersome zoning 
restrictions.  Acquiring a location permit requires clearances by up to 22 local and state 
authorities.  If re-zoning is required, the process can take two years or more. The business permit 
requires at least 30 documents and several months to be issued.  These barriers combine to slow 
new market entry.  Nevertheless, costs related to entry procedures relative to per capita GDP in 
Slovenia are lower than most transition economies (Estrin, 2002).  Most importantly for 
competition, entry can and does occur. 
Privatization of state enterprise.  In November 1992, Slovenia adopted the Ownership 
Transformation Act. The law stipulated that the assets of state enterprise be distributed among 
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shareholders with a distribution rule allocating 20 percent of the shares to the state;7 20 percent 
to Slovenian citizens (each citizen received an allotment of free certificates that they could 
exchange for shares in former state enterprises); 20 percent to enterprise employees;  and the 
remaining 40 percent to bid.  The enterprise employees could acquire these shares at a 50% 
discount payable over four years, so there was a built in bias favoring internal ownership.  The 
process of transferring ownership from state to private hands was completed by 1995. 
Unsurprisingly, the ownership pattern which emerged immediately upon the completion 
of privatization programs of individual enterprises corresponded very well to the conditions 
imposed by the privatization law.  Based on a 1994/95 survey of 183 former state enterprises, 
Simoneti et al (2001) found that internal owners controlled 44 percent of the shares in these firms.  
Even in firms with a majority of internal owners, managers only controlled 5% of the shares so 
the shares were broadly distributed among the current and former firm workers and not the 
managers.  The state retained about 30% of the shares.   Privatization funds (essentially a mutual 
fund with a portfolio of former state owned enterprises) owned about 19 percent of the shares.  
Over time, these relatively diffuse ownership patterns became more concentrated.   By 1999, 40 
percent of initial shareholders had sold their shares, and the 5 largest owners held, on average, 62 
percent of the stock.  Managers and large outside investors increased their holdings, while small 
shareholders and the state reduced their holdings.  
Djankov and Murrell (2002) report that privatized firm performance in the transition 
economies was particularly harmed when workers own the shares.  If those results hold for 
Slovenia, the initial concentration of shares among workers would have hampered firm 
efficiency, but the later move toward more concentrated ownership among either insiders or 
outsiders should improve the efficiency of privatized firms. 
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Policies that allow firm exits 
By 2000, the private sector in Slovenia represented 55% of GDP, a low proportion relative to 
other transition economies (Svejnar, 2002). Private firms can fail, and are more likely to exit if 
they are inefficient.  However, in the Slovene system, state enterprises were also subject to 
competition and the possibility of financial failure.  In contrast, many transition economies 
maintained formal and informal transfers that retarded both state and private sector firm failures 
(Estrin, 2002).8  Bojnec and Xavier’s (2004) analysis of the number of firms by industry in 
Slovenia suggested exit rates from manufacturing of 5% per year.   That is roughly consistent 
with our longitudinal data on Slovenian manufacturing firms: 27% of the manufacturing firms 
existing in 1994 were gone by 2001. 
Foreign competition.  Foreign investors purchased less than 1% of the initially offered 
shares of Slovenian privatized firms and have only made a few acquisitions since that time.  
Foreign direct investment in Slovenia is low compared to other central European transition 
economies.  Consequently, the most important source of competition from foreign firms is 
through imports.  Slovenia already had liberalized trade restrictions before the transition began, 
and the Custom and Tariff Acts of 1996 reduced average tariffs to 5.7 percent. 
Over time, the Slovenian product markets have become more competitive, whether from 
lowering barriers to entry for domestic or foreign firms, privatization, relaxation of restrictions on 
expansion, or import competition.  As shown in Figure 1, the process occurred gradually over 
time.  Our interest is in assessing whether there are coincident changes in measures of firm 
efficiency that correspond to cross-sectional or time series variation in measures of the degree of 
competition facing firms.  Our analysis begins in 1994 when newly installed firm reporting 
procedures created a consistent set of accounting rules for all incorporated firms operating in 
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Slovenia, large or small; foreign or domestic; privately owned or state-owned;  new entrant or 
privatized state enterprise.  Before that time, accounting methods differed and reports were 
unreliable.   
Summary of structural policy changes 
The first year of our data coincides with the installation of the first wave of privatization 
in Slovenia.  By 1994, the easiest efficiency gains from shedding of redundant labor and from 
bankruptcies of the worst enterprises should have occurred.  The past transfer systems that 
subsidized inefficient firms were completely disabled by the end of 1993.  The firms that 
remained were either private or were state enterprises that could demonstrate potential 
profitability to investors.   Consequently, our efficiency measures are not clouded by remaining 
direct political and economic interference in firm decisions regarding entry, exit, and resource 
allocation.  Instead, efficiency should reflect the ongoing process of institutional reforms.  
II. Methodology 
 Our strategy is to trace changes in individual firm efficiency over time, using a measure 
of total factor productivity (TFP).9  To derive our TFP measure empirically, we assume that the 
technology faced by the ith firm in the jth industry in year t is assumed to be approximated by 
the translog production function 
(1) ∑∑∑
= ==
+++=
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where the inputs ijktx  include measures of labor, capital and material inputs; αk and βkl are, 
respectively, first- and second-order translog production parameters; and ijtε  is an error term.  
The error term, a variant of the Solow residual, is our measure of TFP. 10 
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 The total factor productivity has three components that we will explore:  time varying 
industry-specific factors, ;η jt  time varying firm-specific factors, ;ψ it  and time invariant firm-
specific factors, iθ .  In addition, we allow a purely random technology shock, .ξijt .
11  The 
formulation for the error term in (1) is written 
(2) ijtiitjtijt ξθψηε +++=  
 Our strategy is to specify the elements of the error components in a manner that will 
allow us to identify factors that are tied to changes in total factor productivity across firms and 
across time.  The industry-specific component is specified as 
(3) jtjtjt γIη ι+=  
where Ijt is a vector of industry attributes such as industry concentration or import penetration, γ  
is a parameter vector that translates industry attributes into measured TFP for firms in the 
industry, and jtι  is a random error.  Similarly, we can specify the time-varying firm-specific 
component as 
(4) ititit φδfψ +=  
where fit is a vector of firm attributes that change over time such as ownership structure, δ  
describes how these firm attributes affect TFP and itφ  is a random error. 
 The time invariant firm component is specified as 
(5) iii υμFθ +=  
where Fi is a vector of observable firm attributes that do not change over time and iυ  is 
unobserved time invariant firm productivity.12 
 Equation (5) summarizes the selection issues that could bias our estimates of γ  and δ .  
Suppose that iθ  represents a firm-specific technology component that is observable by potential 
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investors.  Then changes in firm ownership status to private ownership or stock ownership from 
state ownership will be correlated with iθ .
13 
 If 0υ i =  for all firms, then selection into firm types is based on the observables, Fi.  
Attractive candidates for inclusion in the vector Fi are ultimate ownership status measures for the 
firms.  In other words, Fi will contain dummy variables indicating whether the firm ultimately 
became privately owned, of mixed state and private ownership, a publicly held company, or 
other ownership type.  The coefficients on these measures, μ,  will reveal whether firms that 
ultimately attained ownership status Fi had atypically high or low TFP prior to any changes in 
their ownership.  The related estimate of δwill reveal whether there was a change in TFP 
associated with the change in ownership status. 
 When 0υ i =  for all i, we can estimate γ,  δ,  and μ  by inserting equations (2-5) into (1) 
and applying ordinary least squares to the resulting reduced form equation.14  If  iυ  in (5) is not 
zero but is distributed ),σN(0, i  then selection into ownership states on the basis of expected 
efficiency will still be driven by the observables, Fi.  All the parameters γ, δ, and μ  can be 
estimated with the appropriate substitutions of equations (2-5) into (1).  However, additional 
efficiency can be obtained by applying a random effects estimator to accommodate the firm-
specific error variance, .σ i  
 If 0)E(υ i ≠  for at least some i, then selection into ownership types will be based in part 
on the unobservable .υ i   The correlation between Fi and iυ  will yield biased coefficients on the  
δ. andγ   With multiple years of data, we can use fixed-effects to estimate a separate iθ  for each 
firm.  We will no longer be able to capture the μ,  but we can derive unbiased estimates of 
δ. andγ  
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 Note that under the null hypothesis that 0)E(υ i =  and 0,υ i ≠  the random effects model 
is appropriate.  In particular, iυ  will be uncorrelated with the regressors, most notably, the Fi.  A 
Hausman specification test can be used to test the validity of the random effects specification.  
Rejection would support the use of the fixed effects model. 
III.  Data 
The data for this study are based on the universe of manufacturing firms existing in 
Slovenia between 1994 and 2001.  The primary information on firms comes from three data 
sources.  The official financial records of the firm, submitted annually under uniform accounting 
procedures to the government of Slovenia, provide information on the firm’s capital stock, 
material inputs, and revenues from domestic and foreign sales.  The Slovenian Business Registry  
includes information on the four-digit industries that describe each firm’s product line(s), the 
year the firm initiated production, and the firm’s type and ownership structure.15  The work 
history data set tells us how many employees of each education level work for each firm.  These 
three data sets can be integrated using a common firm identification number used in all three 
series.16  The variable definitions and sample means are reported in Table 1.17 
 The employment information includes the number of two- or four-year college graduates, 
the number of high school graduates, and the number of primary educated workers in the firm.  
This employment information is in real terms by construction.  However, the accounting data on 
firm output and capital and material inputs are reported in nominal terms.  We convert the 
nominal data into real data, using industry input and output price deflators reported for all years 
1994-2001.  The material input price deflator is a weighted sum of sectoral prices where the 
weights are sectoral input shares generated from an input–output matrix of the Slovenian 
economy.  Output price deflators are reported for each industry.  There is a single capital price 
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series that was applied to all firms.  Using these input and output price series, we generate series 
for real output, capital and material inputs for each firm and for each year.18 
 The sample means reveal some preliminary stylized facts about the Slovenian transition.  
First, total factor productivity rose substantially between 1994 and 2001.  The increases in TFP 
were not due to rising output per firm—in fact average real output fell per firm.  However, all 
capital, employment and material input levels fell by a greater proportion, so firms were 
producing more with less. 
 Numerous changes suggest an increase in the competitive pressure on Slovenian 
manufacturing firms, from imports, foreign owners, more firms, more new firms, and more 
private firms that presumably will be trying to produce efficiently.  There is also considerable 
evidence that firms fail over the period.  The sample means show a dramatic increase in the 
number and the market share of private firms.  Within individual four-digit industries, the 
Herfindahl index falls over time, indicating greater competition.  The proportion of firms under 
foreign ownership does not change over time, but their market share rises.  Import penetration, 
measured by the proportion of industry sales attributable to imports, rises by 79%.  The market 
share of industry output attributable to new entrants (firms that initiated sales after 1993) rises 
from 4% to 21%.  In 1994, firms that will cease operations by 2001 were responsible for 17% of 
industry sales.19  All of these trends suggest rising competitive pressure on firms, but whether 
these changes are actually tied to increases in efficiency will be explored next.  
IV.  Total factor productivity growth over time and across firms 
This section demonstrates that efficiency gains in Slovenia following the policy reforms 
were experienced in virtually all sectors of the economy.  We also demonstrate that measured 
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TFP growth is sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of entrants, exiters, and small firms, and 
that their exclusion greatly understates the efficiency gains during the transition. 
 We first demonstrate that the time trend in the growth of productive efficiency in 
Slovenia manufacturing is robust to alternative assumptions about the error process. Three 
specifications of the translog formulation (1) were estimated: ordinary least squares, a fixed 
effects variant that allows for a separate constant term for each firm, and a random effects variant 
that assumes a different variance for each firm.  We report the average errors by year for the 
three variants in Table 2.  The three series are highly correlated and yield the same general 
inference: there has been a consistent increase in total factor productivity in the 1994-2001 
period.  The increase in TFP per firm is substantial, varying from .222 to .244 log points, which 
implies a 24.9 to 27.6 percent increase in total factor productivity.20  In other words, the average 
manufacturing firm in Slovenia was producing about 25% more from the same level of inputs in 
2001 as in 1994.  This rate of TFP growth is faster than rates reported for 13 OECD 
manufacturing sectors over the 1980-1988 period (Benjamin and Ferrantino, 2001).  It is also 
faster than the annual TFP growth rates reported for the overall business sectors of those 13 
OECD countries over the 1981-1995 period, and faster than 12 of the 13 over the 1996-2000 
period (Gust and Marquez, 2004).21 
 Had we only included firms that were continuously in existence between 1994 and 2001, 
the implied TFP growth would have been markedly smaller.  The implied productivity gain of 
0.177 log points or 19.4% is three-fourths of the true growth of 24.9% reported in column 1.  If 
we exclude firms with fewer than 100 employees, the productivity gains are even smaller: 0.154 
log points or 16.6%.  Clearly, ignoring the productivity contributions of entrants, exiters and 
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small firms significantly biases downward the estimated growth in firm efficiency during the 
transition.  
 While the gains in efficiency are not uniform across firms, they are nevertheless 
widespread across firm types and industries.  In Table 3, we report TFP growth for different firm 
ownership structures.  Because there was little substantive difference in the time paths of TFP 
growth using the various estimation methods, we used the TFP levels based on ordinary least 
squares.  The first column repeats the estimates from Table 2 of the average TFP level across all 
firms to provide a frame of reference.  The second column lists average TFP for privately owned 
firms while the third column lists TFP for all other firms.  Firm efficiency was initially 
significantly lower in private firms, but TFP grew faster in private firms.  Some of the growth 
was due to relatively efficient firms moving from the state sector to the private group, but sorting 
cannot explain much of the rise in TFP among private firms.  First, the initial gap in efficiency is 
less than 0.03 log points, so the rise in efficiency is much larger than can be explained by sorting 
alone.  Second, TFP is rising in both groups, not just the private group.  If migration across firm 
types were the only factor, we would see decreases in TFP among the firms remaining in the 
non-private group as the more efficient state firms switched to the private group.  One conclusion 
from Table 3 is that privately owned firms have more rapid TFP growth.  However, a second 
conclusion is that TFP grows in state-owned enterprises as well, albeit more slowly.  Over the 
full period, efficiency in privately owned firms rose 28% while it rose 18 % in non-private firms.  
 Foreign owned firms were slightly more efficient (.036 log points) than average in 1994.  
They retained that TFP advantage through the end of the period.   Over the eight year period, 
TFP grew almost the same in foreign-owned firms as in the average manufacturing firm at about 
25% growth. 
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 Firms that entered limited liability arrangements may be private, mixed or state owned.  
They began the period with below average efficiency, but gained efficiency somewhat more 
rapidly than average.  By 2001, limited liability firms were significantly more efficient than other 
firms, having experienced a 27.5% gain in TFP versus 24.9% for firms on average. 
 Mixed ownership firms began the period with a small TFP advantage, but experienced 
slower efficiency gains.  By 2001, their TFP advantage had disappeared.  Stock-owned 
companies also started the period with a TFP advantage, but experienced slower TFP growth.  
By 2001, stock-owned companies had significantly lower TFP levels than did the average 
manufacturing firm. 
 Table 4 reports TFP levels by firm size and by entry or exit status.  Initially, large firms 
had a significant TFP advantage, but the faster TFP growth in small firms erased the gap by 
1998.  The implied efficiency growth was 25.6% in small firms versus 21.3% in large firms, so 
ignoring small firms understates efficiency growth.  Firms that opened for business after 1993 
maintained a 0.01 log point TFP advantage over the average firm throughout the period.  The 
average TFP advantage of 0.03 log points for new entrants over the full period is even larger than 
the annual advantage of 0.01 log points.  The reason is that even though TFP levels for new 
entrants were similar to TFP levels for older firms, there were many more new entrants by the 
end of the period when prevailing efficiency levels were higher. Hence the weight of the effect 
of new entrants is to raise efficiency. 
 On the other hand, firms that exited business by 2001 were significantly less efficient 
than the average firm.  The disadvantage for firms destined to close was quite large with an 
average TFP gap of 17% over the eight years.  Eliminating these inefficient firms had an even 
larger effect on productivity than did TFP growth in firms continually in business (25.7% versus 
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19.4%), so ignoring exiting firms biases downward the measured TFP growth in Slovenian 
manufacturing. 
 Table 5 carries the investigation of the distribution of TFP growth to the three-digit 
industry level.  The included industries represent about two-thirds of all manufacturing firms.  
Industries were chosen so that they would have a sufficient number of firms to allow us to 
estimate the production function with some degree of precision.  We estimated the Cobb-
Douglas variant of (1) to conserve on degrees of freedom.22   The results support the view that 
TFP growth was widespread in the Slovenian economy.  Only in the Bakery industry did TFP 
levels fall, and in only three others did TFP rise by less than 10% (footwear, books and 
periodicals and printing).  In all other sectors, TFP grew rapidly.  
 The evidence in Tables 2-5 tells a convincing story that virtually all manufacturing firms 
in Slovenia became more efficient as the transition progressed, regardless of sector, firm size, 
ownership modality or date of entry, or else they went out of business.  It also shows that 
ignoring the role of small firms, entering firms and exiting firms can understate TFP growth by 
as much as one-third of the actual growth.   
V.  Regression analysis of the factors affecting total factor productivity 
 While there is widespread improvement in productive efficiency across firms, as reported 
in tables 2-5, the gains are not uniform.  This section reviews the extent to which measures of 
market competition can be tied to the heterogeneity in TFP growth across firms.  By embedding  
equation (2) into the translog specification (1), we can identify factors that are tied to atypically 
rapid or slow increases in total factor productivity.  Our results are reported in Table 6. 
 To set a basis of comparison, the first specification includes only current firm attributes 
including whether the firm was a new entrant.  The results suggest that private firms and firms 
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with mixed ownership are more efficient.  Firms that entered after the passage of the Amended 
Law on Enterprises in 1993 are also more efficient, although the impact is small.  Stock owned 
companies have marginally lower efficiency, and foreign owned firms have comparable 
efficiency to domestically owned firms. 
 Results in the first column do not control for selection into the various ownership 
modalities.  If, for example, only the most efficient firms are privatized, then private firms may 
be more productive because of efficiencies that predate the private ownership.  To control for 
this selection bias, we add the remaining constant firm attributes that include the ultimate 
ownership status for the firm.  The coefficients on the future status variables will capture the 
average effect of all firms that eventually become private firms.  The coefficient on the current 
firms attributes will then capture the change in efficiency associated with the move to the new 
ownership status. 
 The coefficients on future attributes suggest that firms that were targeted for foreign 
ownership were less productive than average.  Conversely, firms that came under mixed 
ownership or limited liability arrangements were less productive than average.  The impacts are 
small, suggesting that there is not a strong selection process driving the results.  However, there 
is strong evidence that firms that will ultimately go out of business have significantly lower total 
factor productivity.  The coefficient on EXIT implies that firms that are destined to close have 
total factor productivity that is 18% below firms destined to survive.23 
 Once the ultimate firm ownership status is controlled, the impact of current ownership 
status becomes smaller.  Mixed ownership and private ownership are still associated with 
significant, albeit smaller productive effects, and foreign ownership also has a modest impact on 
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TFP.  However, these effects may still be biased because of the correlation between firm 
attributes and attributes of the industry in which the firm resides.   
In column 3, we add measures of the extent of competitive pressure in the industry.  We 
find that the industry attributes are extremely important in explaining variation in firm efficiency.  
The Herfindahl index is based on domestic market shares with 0 indicating perfect competition 
and 1 indicating the firm is a monopolist.  The coefficient on the Herfindahl index implies that a 
monopolist would be 21% less efficient than an otherwise equivalent perfectly competitive firm.  
Firms in industries with a higher share of foreign owned firms were significantly more efficient.  
Note that the foreign-owned firms themselves were not more efficient, but their presence made 
all firms in the industry more efficient.  Private firms were more efficient, but their presence in 
the industry made all other firms more efficient as well.  Firms destined to exit are presumably 
weak competitors.  Firms in industries in which exiting firms have a higher output share are less 
efficient, even those that do not ultimately exit.  Firms in industries in which entrants have a 
greater market share are more efficient, but the effect is small and imprecisely estimated. Finally, 
firms in domestic industries that have greater import penetration are modestly less efficient.   
 Entering firms were 2% more efficient than firms that were born before 1994.  Of the 
future status variables, firms that ultimately exit still retained their large TFP disadvantage.  
Firms that ultimately became private, mixed ownership or limited liability firms had significant 
TFP advantage.  Upon attaining their new status, private firms raise TFP by 6%, stock owned 
companies lose 4%,  mixed ownership firms gain 3%, and limited liability firms lose 3%.   
 The specification in column 3 presumes that selection into ownership types is based 
solely on observable attributes so that 0υ i = in equation (5).  If 0υ i ≠ , but 0) υE( i = for all i, 
selection will still depend only on observables but a random-effects estimator will provide added 
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efficiency.  Results from that specification are reported in column 4.  The test for nonzero 
variance of the i υ  favored the random-effects estimator over the least squares estimate of 
column 3.  Nevertheless, the results are similar to those in column 3 with the exception that 
current firm attributes generally lose significance while firm constant attributes gain strength.   
Estimates of μ  in column 4 suggest that new entrants were 3% more efficient than firms 
that opened before 1993.  Firms destined to exit were 16% less efficient than firms that survived 
through 2001.24  Firms that ended the period as private firms, limited liability partnerships or 
under mixed ownership were more efficient, suggesting that selection into these ownership types 
were based on observable firm productive attributes.  However, the opposite holds for firms 
bought by foreign owners or that became privatized through the issuance of stock.  Taken as a 
whole, the joint significance of the μ  in column 4 suggests nonrandom selection into ownership 
types.  However, the Hausman test suggests that unobservable (to the econometrician) productive 
attributes were also important, so we turn to the fixed-effect estimates. 
When fixed-effects are imposed, only one firm–level current measure retains 
significance.  Limited liability firms still had a TFP disadvantage, albeit only 4% smaller than 
other firms.  No other firm-level indicators mattered.  The joint test that the coefficients on 
current firm attributes were equal zero could not be rejected at standard significance levels.  
Furthermore, the aggregated impact of theδ , evaluated at the change in sample means from 1994 
to 2001 reported in Table 1, explains none of the growth in TFP over the sample period. 
 On the other hand, all industry level measures still retain signs that are consistent with the 
implied impact of market competition on productive efficiency.   The only imprecisely estimated 
effect is that of the Herfindahl index which implies a monopolist is only 2% less efficient than a 
perfectly competitive firm.  Recall that the Herfindahl index was defined only on domestic 
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production, so even a monopolist could face competition from foreign producers.25  All the other 
estimated industry effects support the role of competition in significantly enhancing firm 
efficiency.  Firms in industries that have higher market shares (net of own firm production) 
controlled by private firms, foreign-owned firms, and new entrants all had rising TFP.  Note that 
private firms and foreign owned firms were not themselves more efficient, but that their presence 
made all the firms in the industry more efficient.  Firms in industries with higher import 
penetration also were more efficient.  Firms are less efficient in industries with weak 
competitors, as indicated by a high net market share going to eventual exiters.  The aggregated 
industry effects, γ , evaluated at the change in sample means over the sample period, sum to 
0.088 or 40% of the change in TFP over the period.  These represent external benefits from 
market competition, independent of the impact of current firm-specific factors. 
 Konings (2005) investigation of price-cost margins in Romanian and Bulgarian firms 
found similar roles for competition in fostering efficiency.  He reported that firms in more 
competitive sectors had significantly lower price cost margins.  To the extent that his results 
generalize to Slovenia, our finding that firms in more competitive markets also had atypically 
large total factor productivity gains and hence falling production costs suggests a double benefit 
of competition to a transition economy.  Not only does competition foster more efficient 
production, but the benefits to consumers in the form of lower prices are even greater than the 
cost saving to the firm.  Konings did not find as strong a role for import penetration in lowering 
price cost margins in sectors that were already competitive.  However, he did find in more 
concentrated sectors that import competition seemed to force down prices, again suggesting that 
cost savings from induced efficiencies are passed on to consumers more than proportionally.   
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A portion of the remaining efficiency gain is due to entry and exit of firms.  The 
contribution of firm exiters, evaluating the estimate in column 3 at sample means, is 0.04 log 
points.  The contribution of new entrants is 0.005 log points.  Together, firm entry and exit 
contribute an additional 21% of the estimated TFP growth over the sample period.  The role of 
firm entry and exit in explaining efficiency growth in Slovenian manufacturing corresponds 
closely to the proportion of efficiency growth attributable to entry and exit in western economies 
as summarized by Bartelsman and Doms (2002). 
Taking the two sources of TFP growth together, we estimate that 61% of the growth in 
firm efficiency between 1994 and 2001 can be attributable to increases in measure market 
competition and firm entry and exit.  The remaining 39% of the TFP growth is due to common 
effects across all firms.  These could be due to business cycle effects or reversion to mean 
efficiency levels following the initial shock of the transition.  However, if the competitive policy 
changes summarized in Figure 1 have an impact, they would be responsible for at least some of 
the 39% of TFP growth not explained by entry, exit, or our measures of market competition.  
Therefore, our estimate that competitive pressures and sorting are responsible for 61% of TFP 
growth is a lower bound estimate of their effects.  
 The relative unimportance of firm ownership structure in our study contrasts with 
findings in earlier studies.  For example, Konings (2005) found that privatized firms and foreign-
owned firms had higher price-cost margins, other things equal.  It is possible that our finding that 
ownership structure did not matter for efficiency gains is a consequence of the fact that all 
Slovene enterprises, state or private, faced the possibility of bankruptcy.  As a result, state firms 
behaved more like private firms in Slovenia.  Second, the scope for improvements of corporate 
governance in Slovenia may have been smaller than in other transition countries to the extent 
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that managers in the worker self-managed Yugoslav system had considerable autonomy which 
may have led some firms to be relatively efficient even before transition. Consequently, the 
privatized state firms did not experience atypical growth in efficiency.  However, the most 
interesting finding in our context is that while privately owned firms or foreign owned firms 
were not atypically efficient, industries with higher market shares attributable to private firms, 
foreign-owned firms, newly entered firms, or foreign sourced goods had faster efficiency growth.  
When we ignore these industry-level aggregates of firm attributes, it appears that firm private or 
foreign ownership behaves more as in previous studies.  Consequently, earlier productivity 
effects attributed to ownership structure may have masked the market competition effects that 
dominate our paper. 
VI.  Robustness 
In Table 7, we replicate the fixed effect estimates under various scenarios.  In column 2, 
we report a variant of the Olley-Pakes (1996) estimation strategy.  Their concern was in deriving 
unbiased estimates of α  and β  in (1) which is tangential to our concern with evaluating factors 
affecting the time path of ijtε .  Nevertheless, there may be a concern that unmeasured firm 
heterogeneity in production is correlated with our industry-level measures of market competition.  
Under the assumption that firm exit and investment decisions are predicated on firm expectations 
of future market structure and factor prices, and that firm profits are increasing in capital, the 
firms idiosyncratic productivity in (4), ,itϕ  can be written as 
(6) ),k,a,h(i ittttit ∈=ϕ  
where it is current investment, at is the age of the firm, kt is the firm’s capital stock, and ∈ it is an 
approximation error assumed to be purely random.  Inserting (6) into (4) gives us  
(4') ),k,a,h(iδfψ ittttitit ∈+=  
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Olley and Pakes used an explicit formulation for h(·) in order to derive unbiased structural 
estimates of the α and β in (1).  We are not interested in those parameters, so instead, we replace  
h(·) with its second-order Taylor approximation and then estimate (1) imposing equations (2), (3) 
and (4').  The results are reported in the second column of Table 7.  The proportion of TFP 
growth that can be jointly attributed to market competition falls somewhat from 41% to 35%.  
Nevertheless, the coefficients are very consistent in both sign and magnitude.  The null 
hypothesis that all the coefficients in the approximation of h(·) are jointly zero could not be 
rejected.  Current firm attributes continue to have no effect. 
 In column 3, we repeat the fixed-effect estimation excluding entrants and exiters from the 
sample.  Current firm attributes continue to have no effect.  The market competition measures 
still retain sign and significance.  Their joint effect actually rises to 0.103 or 58% of the TFP 
growth in those firms.  Thus, while using a balanced sample biases downward the overall 
estimate of TFP growth, it increases the proportion attributable to market competition. 
 The last column repeats the exercise but excludes firms with fewer than 100 employees.  
The conclusion that current firm attributes have no effect still holds.  However, several of the 
market competition variables switch signs and significance from the full sample.  The share of 
foreign owned firms and market entrants now lower efficiency.  The impact of import 
penetration is reduced by 60%.  The joint effect of market competition on efficiency falls to 0.05 
or 33% of the total TFP growth in those firms.  It is apparent that excluding small firms from the 
sample causes significant bias in the estimated impact of market pressures on firm efficiency. 
 The results from Table 7 demonstrate that the general finding that increased market 
competition leads to increased efficiency holds when alternative definitions and assumptions 
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about the error process are imposed.  They also show that excluding small firms, entrants and 
exiters can have large effects on the estimated magnitude of the market competition effect. 
VII. Structural Reform and Efficiency 
 We cannot perform a rigorous test of the relationship between structural reforms and our 
measures of productive efficiency because the EBRD data presented in Figure 1 are not 
differentiated by firm or industry.  Instead, they are only reported for the country as a whole.  
Because we have only 7 years of data, we have only 7 degrees of freedom with which to 
compare our efficiency measures and the EBRD policy indexes.  Nevertheless, the correlation 
between the two series is of interest.  In Figure 2, we present the simple bivariate relationship 
between TFP and the average of the structural reform indexes shown in Figure 1.  The average of 
the EBRD indexes explains 93% of the variation in the TFP measure over time.  The average of 
the various EBRD indexes strongly outperformed any single index, consistent with the 
presumption that it is the mixture of liberalization policies supporting competition that is 
important as opposed to any single policy.  
VIII Conclusion 
Since seceding from former Yugoslavia, Slovenia has undertaken a slow but progressive 
dismantling of its former socialist economy and replaced it with more market oriented policies.  
The reforms occurred steadily through the decade of the 1990s.  One of the oldest propositions in 
economics is that competition spurs economic efficiency.  The introduction of competition was 
expected to improve the efficiency of formerly planned economies, moderating the adverse 
consequences of transition for output.  Our evaluation of the data from Slovenian manufacturing 
is strongly supportive of the role of market competition.  TFP growth in Slovenia over the period 
averaged 2.8% per year, a growth rate that compares favorably to most OECD countries.  The 
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TFP growth is broad-based across industries, across private and state firms, and across small and 
large firms.  It coincides with indexes of the degree of policy liberalization in Slovenia, 
suggesting that policies fostering market competition contributed to the growth of market 
pressures. 
An analysis of the sources of TFP growth shows that in Slovenia, changes from one 
ownership type to another had virtually no impact on firm TFP growth.  Beyond a firm-specific, 
time-invariant productivity level, firm-level variables do not alter TFP.  However, changes in 
industry attributes such as the extent of foreign competition, foreign ownership, private 
ownership, and the market share of new entrants and eventual exiters can explain 40% of TFP 
growth. An additional 21% can be attributed to the entrance of relatively efficient firms, and 
more importantly, the exit of relatively inefficient establishments.  
Many studies have attempted to measure the impact of transition by comparing the 
performance of state enterprises against that of private firms.  For example, Frydman et al (1999) 
found that private firms generate more sales than state enterprise, but have similar unit costs.  
Anderson et al (2000b) found that Mongolian state enterprises had a TFP advantage over 
privately owned firms.  Djankov and Murrell’s (2002) review found that privatization had a wide 
range of effects on productivity, most positive but some negative.  In Slovenia, state firms are 
not protected from competition or risk of bankruptcy.  Our results suggest that the distinction 
between firm ownership types is not as important as whether those firms face competitive 
pressures. However, firm ownership type did matter in the aggregate.  Competitive pressures at 
the industry  level due to increased industry share of private firms, foreign-owned firms, and 
imported goods raised TFP growth rates of all firms in the industry regardless of ownership 
structure.   
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In addition, we find that small firms, new market entrants, and exiting firms have a large 
impact on measured TFP growth in transition.  Efficiency gains appear to occur over time and 
not at one instance.  Past studies that concentrated on large firms, balanced panels, and short time 
frames may have missed some of the efficiency gains that resulted from the transition to market. 
Consequently, the efficiency gains from the move to more competitive markets may be much 
larger than has been apparent from past studies. 
Svejnar (2002) has characterized Slovenia as being relatively slow to reform its economic 
institutions in ways that would free market forces.  Our results suggest that the “go slow” 
philosophy came at the cost of delaying the efficiency gains that spurred economic growth 
throughout the period we analyze.  Presumably these gains could have come sooner had Slovenia 
pursued these institutional reforms more aggressively earlier in the transition. 
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Table 1:  Sample means and standard deviations for the full sample and means for 1994 and 2001 
 
        1994-2001  1994 2001 
Variable       Mean   Std. Dev.  Mean Mean 
ENDOGENOUS 
tfp  total factor productivity from OLS    0.000   0.363  -0.137  0.086 
tfpfe  total factor productivity assuming fixed effects 0.000   0.406  -0.159  0.086 
tfpre  total factor productivity assuming random effects 0.023  0.367  -0.116  0.108 
lnrq   log of real output    6.01   2.03   6.188 6.088 
 
INPUTS 
lnrk   log of real capital stock    4.62   2.45  4.797  4.667 
lnrm   log of real value of materials   5.46   2.08  5.746  5.433 
lnuniv   log of 2- or 4-year university educated employees 0.60   1.11     0.783  0.565 
lnhigh  log of high school educated employees  1.70   1.64     1.890  1.693  
lnprim   log of employees with < high school education 1.02   1.59     1.303  0.948 
lnmonth  log of months of operation    2.481   0.073  2.480  2.483 
 
CURRENT FIRM ATTRIBUTES 
private   firm is private in current year   0.837 0.369  0.636 0.906 
stockco   firm currently issues publicly traded stock  0.075  0.264  0.037  0.085 
ltdliab   firm is currently a limited liability firm  0.858  0.349  0.823 0.862 
mixed   firm is currently under mixed ownership  0.061  0.239  0.080  0.054 
forown   firm is currently foreign owned     0.075  0.263  0.068  0.078 
 
CONSTANT FIRM ATTRIBUTES  
ENTRY   firm’s birth year after 1993   0.254  0.435  0.074  0.324 
EXIT   firm has no employees by 2001   0.111  0.314     0.265  0.000 
PRIVATE firm becomes private by 2001   0.884  0.321  0.788  0.916 
STOCKCO  firm issues publicly traded stock by 2001  0.108  0.311  0.154  0.094 
LTDLIAB  firm becomes a limited liability firm by 2001 0.895  0.306  0.868  0.893 
MIXED   firm under mixed ownership by 2001  0.089  0.285  0.123  0.074 
FOROWN  firm under foreign ownership by 2001  0.096  0.294  0.083  0.088 
 
FOUR-DIGIT INDUSTRY ATTRIBUTESa 
HERF   Herfindahl concentration index   0.137  0.151  0.140  0.041 
PRIVSHR Share of industry output sold by private firms 0.589  0.305  0.204  0.732 
FORSHR  Share of industry output sold by foreign owned firms 0.100   0.145  0.080  0.132 
ENTSHR  Share of industry output sold by new entrants 0.147  0.142  0.036  0.205 
EXITSHR Share of industry output sold by firms that will exit 0.059  0.097     0.168  0.000 
IMPORTSHR Share of industry sales due to imports  0.338  0.22     0.196  0.350 
 
N        28047   2904 4244 
__________________________________ 
a Except for IMPORTSHR, these measures are net of own firm’s output share 
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Table 2:  Time Path of Alternative Estimates of Firm Total Factor Productivity in Slovenia 
Manufacturing, 1994-2001 
Year All Firms, 
tfpa 
All Firms, 
tfpfeb 
All Firms, 
tfprec 
Balanced 
Paneld, tfpa 
Balanced 
Large Firm 
Panele, tfpa 
1994 -0.136 -0.158 -0.115 -0.112 -0.087 
1995 -0.115 -0.119 -0.090 -0.097 -0.073 
1996 -0.048 -0.046 -0.023 -0.032 -0.012 
1997 0.010 0.014 0.034 0.016 0.035 
1998 0.015 0.021 0.039 0.012 0.024 
1999 0.032 0.036 0.055 0.027 0.009 
2000 0.081 0.085 0.104 0.067 0.066 
2001 0.086 0.086 0.108 0.065 0.067 
      
1994-2001 0.222 0.244 0.223 0.177 0.154 
Average 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.000 
      
a tfp is total factor productivity measured as the error from OLS estimates of the translog production 
function, designated equation (1) in the paper. 
b tfpfe is total factor productivity measured as the error derived from a fixed effects estimate of the 
translog production function . 
c tfpre is total factor productivity measured as the error derived from a random effects estimate of the 
translog production function. 
d tfp estimate over the subsample of firms in continuous production from 1994 through 2001. 
e tfp estimate over the subsample of firms with more than 100 employees in continuous production 
from 1994 through 2001. 
 
Correlation Matrix of the alternative tfp estimates over 28,047 observations 
 tfp tfpfe tfpre  
tfp 1.0    
tfpfe .90 1.0   
tfpre .99 .94 1.0  
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Table 3:  Time Path of Firm Total Factor Productivity, by Slovenia Manufacturing Firm Ownership Type, 1994-2001a 
Year All Firms, TFP Privateb Not Privateb Foreign-Ownedb Limited Liability 
Firmb 
Mixed 
Ownershipb 
Stock 
Companyb 
1994 -0.136 -0.147** -0.119** -0.100 -0.148** -0.107 -0.122 
1995 -0.115 -0.116* -0.143* -0.115 -0.117 -0.105 -0.052** 
1996 -0.048 -0.053 -0.079 -0.016 -0.048 0.009** -0.001** 
1997 0.010 0.015** -0.018** -0.005 0.010 0.021 0.044** 
1998 0.015 0.022** -0.032** 0.027 0.015 0.011 0.015 
1999 0.032 0.036** 0.000** 0.054 0.032 0.054 0.032 
2000 0.081 0.085* 0.046* 0.094 0.084* 0.083 0.061 
2001 0.086 0.090 0.050 0.120* 0.095** 0.087 0.039** 
        
1994-2001 0.222 0.247 0.169 0.220 0.243 0.194 0.161 
Average 0.000 0.017** -0.053** 0.026** 0.001 0.012 0.018** 
 
a Total factor productivity is measured as the error from OLS estimates of the translog production function , designated equation (1) in the paper. 
b t-tests of the null hypothesis that mean TFP are equal between the stated ownership type versus all other firms were conducted, allowing for different 
variances in the two groups. 
* indicates significant differences at the .10 confidence level. 
** indicates significance at the .05 level. 
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Table 4:  Time Path of Firm Total Factor Productivity, by Slovenia Manufacturing, Firm Size, Entry Cohort, and Mortality a 
Year All Firms, TFP <100 Employeesb 100+ Employeesb Entryb Exitb 
1994 -0.136 -0.142** -0.101** -.129 -.229** 
1995 -0.115 -0.118* -0.090* -.115 -.223** 
1996 -0.048 -0.050** -0.025** -.058 -.164** 
1997 0.010 0.008* 0.031* .006 -.114** 
1998 0.015 0.014 0.024 .022 -.126** 
1999 0.032 0.034 0.018 .045 -.182** 
2000 0.081 0.081 0.084 .092 -.205** 
2001 0.086 0.086 0.092 .097 0c  
      
Difference between 
2001and 1994 
0.222 0.228 0.193 .226 .229 
Average 0.000 -0.0001 0.001 .031** -.181** 
 
a TFP is measured as the error from OLS estimates of the translog production function (equation (1) in the paper). 
b t-tests of the null hypothesis that mean TFP are equal between the stated ownership type versus all other firms were conducted, 
allowing for different variances in the two groups. 
* indicates significant differences at the .10 confidence level. 
** indicates significance at the .05 level. 
cBy definition, TFP = 0 for firms no longer in business. 
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Table 5:  Total Factor Productivity Estimates by Detailed Manufacturing Sectora 
            
Industry SICb Sharec 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Cumulative 
1994-2001 
Bakery  15.8 2.9% 0.055 0.008 -0.054 0.039 0.018 -0.008 0.028 -0.067 -0.122 
Woven textiles 17.4, 17.5 1.6% -0.105 -0.087 -0.004 0.048 -0.001 -0.009 0.04 0.042 0.147 
Clothing 18.2 8.0% -0.125 -0.042 0.014 0.032 0.037 -0.024 0.036 0.076 0.201 
Footwear 19.2, 19.3 1.9% 0.02 -0.14 -0.03 0.007 0.02 0.023 0.02 0.03 0.01 
Lumber  20.1 2.3% -0.07 -0.095 -0.064 -0.017 0.025 0.041 0.018 0.106 0.176 
Plywood 20.2 2.0% -0.134 -0.075 -0.046 -0.015 -0.004 0.009 0.117 0.049 0.183 
Wooden Crates 20.4 1.3% -0.15 -0.103 -0.084 0.053 0.029 0.024 0.072 0.124 0.274 
Paper Products 21.21-21.23 0.9% -0.135 -0.167 -0.004 0.051 0.03 0.051 0.022 0.063 0.198 
Book, Periodicals 22.11-22.13 1.4% -0.021 -0.146 0.002 0.021 0.032 0.065 0.022 0.003 0.024 
Printing 22.21,22.22 2.6% -0.065 -0.118 -0.031 0.06 0.053 0.093 0.025 0.003 0.068 
Rubber 25.1 0.8% -0.097 -0.183 -0.054 0.037 0.05 -0.149 0.113 0.117 0.214 
Plastics 25.2 5.3% -0.119 -0.179 -0.06 -0.02 0.026 0.038 0.114 0.09 0.209 
Cement and Stone products 26.6, 26.7 1.2% -0.121 -0.149 -0.096 0 0.029 0.082 0.064 0.059 0.18 
Metal Castings for plumbing, etc. 27.5 0.7% -0.055 -0.075 0 -0.074 0.028 0.053 0.068 0.051 0.106 
Metal Finishing 28.5 9.8% -0.108 -0.089 -0.026 -0.077 -0.035 0.033 0.069 0.029 0.137 
Cutlery, hand tools 28.6 2.4% -0.044 -0.113 -0.026 -0.052 0.006 0.072 0.086 0.073 0.117 
Manufacturing Equipment 29.2 1.7% -0.13 -0.149 -0.079 -0.078 -0.04 -0.042 0.092 0.152 0.282 
Power hand tools 29.5 2.0% -0.117 -0.166 -0.045 0.014 -0.011 0.019 0.192 0.221 0.338 
Electrical Machinery 31.6 3.5% -0.221 -0.107 -0.077 -0.037 0.036 0.078 0.121 0.226 0.447 
Radio, TV, Communication equip. 32 1.9% -0.185 -0.092 -0.093 0.045 0.067 0.131 0.287 0.288 0.473 
Precision testing and control 33.2, 33.3 1.2% -0.286 -0.15 -0.112 -0.019 0.019 0.018 0.11 0.153 0.439 
Furniture 36.1 8.3% -0.148 -0.053 -0.019 0.028 0.011 -0.016 0.065 0.084 0.232 
 
a Total Factor Productivity measured by residuals from OLS estimation of the Cobb-Douglas form of equation (1), restricting all second order coefficients to zero. 
b Industrial classification numbers used for the Slovenian National Income and Product Accounts 
c Industry’s share of total manufacturing output in Slovenia.  These sectors represent approximately two-thirds of Slovenian manufacturing output over the period. 
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Table 6:  Estimation of impacts of firm and industry variables on total factor productivity in Slovenian 
manufacturing firms, 1994-2001 
      
Current Firm Attributes, δ  OLS OLS OLS Random Effects Fixed Effects 
  private  0.159** 0.114** 0.064** 0.034** 0.018 
 (16.7) (10.7) (4.55) (2.41) (1.19) 
  stockco  -0.036** -0.022 -0.044** -0.040** -0.021 
 (2.73) (1.26) (2.47) (2.29) (1.13) 
  ltdliab -0.015 -0.038** -0.035** -0.047** -0.038** 
 (1.49) (2.66) (2.42) (3.04) (2.15) 
  mixed  0.123** 0.065** 0.034** 0.024 0.010 
 (10.2) (3.77) (1.96) (1.41) (0.54) 
  forown  -0.007 0.039** 0.0003 -0.008 -0.010 
 (0.87) (2.31) (0.02) (0.53) (0.61) 
Constant Firm Attributes,μ       
  ENTRY 0.035** 0.028** 0.021** 0.031** (dropped) 
 (6.81) (5.57) (3.95) (3.17)  
  EXIT   -0.201** -0.154** -0.172**   (dropped) 
  (28.5) (21.2) (15.0) 
  PRIVATE  0.013 0.024* 0.103**   (dropped) 
  (0.96) (1.76) (5.23) 
  STOCKCO  -0.005 0.017 -0.052**   (dropped) 
  (0.30) (1.07) (2.18) 
  LTDLIAB  0.053** 0.057** 0.054**   (dropped) 
  (4.05) (4.30) (2.59) 
  MIXED   0.036** 0.040** 0.052**   (dropped) 
  (2.63) (2.86) (2.36) 
  FOROWN   -0.038** -0.002 -0.035* (dropped) 
  (2.51) (0.12) (1.75)  
Industry Attributes, γ       
  HERF    -0.238** -0.121** -0.023 
   (16.0) (7.18) (1.16) 
  PRIVSHR    0.154** 0.102** 0.054** 
   (18.1) (11.4) (5.29) 
  FORSHR    0.240** 0.151** 0.107** 
   (15.0) (8.48) (5.23) 
  ENTSHR    0.013 0.054** 0.070** 
   (0.73) (2.64) (2.88) 
  EXITSHR    -0.276** -0.184** -0.149** 
   (11.4) (8.01) (5.90) 
  IMPORTSHR    -.022** 0.023 0.097** 
   (7.98) (1.60) (4.90) 
      
      
N 27949 27949 25726 25726 25726 
R2 .97 .97 .97 .97 .97 
      
Note:  coefficients are taken from translog production function estimation of equation (1) augmented with the 
variables that make up equation (2).  The coefficients on the translog specification including all first and second 
order terms in the logs of real capital, materials, numbers of university, high school and primary school trained 
workers are withheld to conserve space.  Coefficients on the log of months of firm operation, dummy variables 
indicating no employees an education group, and the constant are also suppressed. 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. * indicates significance at the .10 level.  ** indicates significance at the .05 
level. 
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Table 7:  Alternative fixed-effect estimation of impacts of firm and industry variables on total factor 
productivity in Slovenian manufacturing firms, 1994-2001 
      
Current Firm Attributes, δ  Column 5 of 
Table 6 
Olley-Pakes Balanced 
Panel 
Balanced Large 
Firm Panel 
 
  private  0.018 0.006 0.021 0.031  
 (1.19) (0.36) (1.28) (1.31)  
  stockco  -0.021 0.002 -0.029 -0.025  
 (1.13) (0.10) (1.52) (1.00)  
  Ltdliab -0.038** -0.039** -0.043** -0.046*  
 (2.15) (2.00) (2.41) (1.71)  
  mixed  0.010 0.003 0.018 0.023  
 (0.54) (0.15) (0.94) (0.91)  
  forown  -0.010 -0.008 0.007 0.013  
 (0.61) (0.48) (0.36) (0.33)  
Industry Attributes, γ       
  HERF  -0.023 -0.019 -0.015 -0.013  
 (1.16) (0.92) (0.65) (0.21)  
  PRIVSHR  0.054** 0.047** 0.063** 0.064**  
 (5.29) (4.21) (5.71) (2.27)  
  FORSHR  0.107** 0.112** 0.108** -0.070  
 (5.23) (5.05) (4.86) (1.12)  
  ENTSHR  0.070** 0.075** 0.124** -0.145**  
 (2.88) (2.95) (4.51) (2.10)  
  EXITSHR  -0.149** -0.115** -0.157** -0.225**  
 (5.90) (4.13) (5.70) (2.98)  
  IMPORTSHR  0.097** 0.083** 0.102** 0.040**  
 (4.90) (3.72) (4.77) (0.77)  
      
      
N 25726 22447 16911 2246  
R2 .97 .96 .97 .93  
      
Notes:  
      Column 1 is taken from the last column in Table 6 
      Column 2 is a variant of the Olley-Pakes(1996) specification.  In this application, we supplement the 
specification in column 1 with i, i*k, a*k, a*i, and i2 , where i is the logarithm of real investment, k is the 
logarithm of the capital stock, and a is the logarithm of the firm’s age.  Linear and quadratic terms in firm 
age are controlled by the fixed effect.  The null hypothesis that the five terms can be excluded could not be 
rejected at standard significance levels (F(5,16893) = 1.79. 
      Column 3 replicates Column 1, but excludes firms that enter or exit the sample. 
      Column 4 replicates Column 3, but excludes firms with fewer than 100 employees. 
      Other notes are the same as in Table 6. 
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_________________________________________ 
Country policies are graded on the extent to which they encourage free competition from D = 1: least liberalized to A+ = 4.3: most liberalized. The 
average grade is the simple average across all evaluated policies including legal climate and infrastructure reforms.  Labor market policies were 
not evaluated.
Figure 1:  Time Path of Slovenian Structural Reforms, 1991-2001
Source:  EBRD Transition Report, various issues
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Figure 2: TFP versus Liberalization Index, 1994-2001
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Index is the average of the OECD Index values of various structural reforms as shown in Figure  
1.  The TFP value is that reported in column 1 of Table 2. 
 42
Endnotes 
 
1 The Joskow and Rose (1989) summary suggests that increased market competition from 
deregulation in the United States and privatization of public enterprise in Europe generally led to 
increases in labor productivity.  The few studies that examine the role of competition in fostering 
efficiency in unregulated environments yielded mixed results.  For example in two studies of 
British firms, Nickell (1996) found that competition enhances efficiency while Blanchflower and 
Machin (1996) found no effect. 
 
2 Of course, much of the variation reflects differences in methodology and measures of firm 
performance.  However, even the most careful studies that control for selection problems can 
generate conflicting results.  For example, Anderson et al (2000b) found that state enterprises 
were more efficient than private firms while Frydman et al (1999) found that privatization raises 
measures of firm performance.  The differences may be in the measure of firm performance 
used.  When Frydman et al use a measure of efficiency, namely unit cost, the differences 
between private and state enterprise disappear.  Their other measures (revenue growth, 
employment growth and revenue per employee) do not have an obvious connection to efficiency. 
 
3 Vodopivec (1993) discusses this system in detail. 
 
4 The EBRD index did not include labor market reforms, but Slovenia also took a gradualist 
approach in adjusting labor market policies.  Early on, the government imposed many provisions 
to protect jobs in traditional sectors. By 1991, restrictions on layoffs and mandated severance 
were reduced.  Despite the liberalization, Riboud, Sanchez-Paramo and Silva-Jauregui (2001) 
concluded that Slovenia's labor policies were the most restrictive of the formerly planned 
economies that were being targeted for accession to the European Union.  Boeri and Terrell 
(2002) provide a comparative review of labor market policies in transition economies. 
 
5 This discussion is based on FIAS (2000). 
 
6 The registration fees themselves are not excessive, ranging from US $500 for a limited liability 
company to $1,100 for a joint-stock company.  Consequently, the cost of these barriers is more 
in opportunity costs of time than in money. 
 
7 These shares formed the holdings of the Slovenian state pension fund and an endowment fund 
from which restitution payments were to be made. 
 
8 The likelihood that the government will prevent state firm failure may vary even within 
countries.  Anderson et al (2000a) found that only 27% of Mongolian state enterprise thought the 
government would bail them out at least partially if the firm failed with 73% stating the 
government would do nothing to help.  In China, Li and Liang (1998) found that state enterprises 
with negative cash flow did not reduce their employment of redundant workers, apparently 
because all expected the government to make up the losses.  
 
9  Konings (2005) derives a dual to the traditional Solow residual framework that we employ.  
His method assumes that firms are maximizing profits, an assumption that is inconsistent within 
our framework in which some firms may be becoming more efficient over time due to 
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competitive pressures while other firms that are more insulated from competition are able to 
remain inefficient. Konings framework is aimed at estimating price-cost margins and not firm 
efficiency per se, and he ends up differencing away the Solow residual that is the focus of our 
analysis.  Nevertheless, our results correspond with his in interesting ways, as will be discussed 
below. 
 
10 Note that by construction, ijtε  is orthogonal to the inputs, so it is productivity attached to the 
firm’s overall production, but not to specific inputs. 
 
11 We could also specify a time varying error component that is common across all firms and 
industries.  The most likely source of such common national shocks would be government tax 
and transfer policies and regulatory policies.  However, these policies were stable over the 
sample period. 
 
12 Bartlesman and Doms (2000) concluded that there is considerable persistence in firm 
productivity, so that highly productive firms in one year are likley to be highly productive in 
other years.  This suggests that the fixed effect component υi is likely to be important. 
 
13 This is almost certainly true.  Simoneti et al (2001) found that insider investment was heaviest 
in firms that had higher profits in the years preceding privatization.  It is not clear if the higher 
profitability was a permanent or transitory state.  Our own results suggest the latter, in that firms 
that became stock-owned had slower TFP growth than other firms. 
 
14 Note that it is more efficient to estimate the system of equations in one step than to estimate 
(1), derive estimates of ijtε , and then to estimate equation (2) with appropriate substitutions for 
.andθ,ψ,η iitjt  
 
15 We distinguish private and state ownership, as well as ownership by domestic and foreign 
owners. We also have information whether the firm is a publicly traded stock company or a 
limited liability company. 
 
16 For more information about the data sets, see Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2003) which use 
the same sources. 
 
17 Note that to suit our empirical analysis, the variables ENTRY and EXIT are defined in a 
specific way. Namely, ENTRY is set equal to one in all years if the firm came into existence any 
year after 1993 (thus a firm which was founded in 1995 is considered an entrant also in 1996 and 
subsequent years of analysis).  Similarly, EXIT is set equal to one in all years if the firm had no 
employees in 2001.  Thus, a firm that began operations in 1996 and ceased operations in 2000 
will have ENTRY = 1 and EXIT= 1 for all years of its existence. 
 
18 Most studies of market efficiency in western economies have concentrated on manufacturing 
because data on inputs and outputs are more readily available and comparable across firms.  In 
our case, we did not have sufficient detail on input and output prices to allow us to perform the 
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analysis on industries outside manufacturing.  For example, we would not be able to assess how 
much of the revenue changes in the service sector was due to increases in service output versus 
increases in unit prices. However, our results for manufacturing may not carry over to all sectors.  
According to IMAD (2003),  growth of market-oriented services in Slovenia has been so slow 
that the gap in the share of these services in GDP rose between Slovenia and the European 
Community from 1995 to 2001.  The slow growth in these services has been attributed to their 
being shielded from market pressures, causing the service sector to lag behind other sectors in 
productivity growth.  
 
19 Employment shares are similar.  New entrants were responsible for 16% of all employment in 
manufacturing in 2001, while firms that exit by 2001 employed 15% of all manufacturing 
employees in 1994. 
 
20 Computed, for example, as 100*(exp(.222) – 1). 
 
21 Finland had faster TFP growth over the 1996-2000 period. 
 
22 This constrains all the βkl =0 in equation (1). 
 
23 Bojec and Xavier (2004) reported that firms were more likely to exit in sectors with greater 
import penetration and lower (more competitive) Herfindahl indexes, consistent with our 
presumption that competition helps force exits of inefficient firms. 
 
24 The percentage change associated with firm exits is computed as 100*(exp(-.172) – 1). 
 
25 The simple correlation between the Herfindahl index and import share was 0.27, suggesting a 
modest increase in import penetration in more concentrated sectors.  
